By Jonathan Jacobs
During this unique research, Jonathan Jacobs presents a brand new account of moral realism that mixes either summary meta-ethical matters defining the controversy on realism and urban issues in ethical psychology. Jacobs argues that useful reasoners can either comprehend the moral importance of evidence and be prompted to behave through that knowing. In that feel, target concerns are prescriptive. In his dialogue of the speculation of functional realism, he extends topics and claims originating in Aristotelian ethics whereas enticing with crucial modern literature. Arguing that hope and cause can agree on what's sturdy, Jacobs explains how strong motion is of course exciting to the agent. In performing good, the agent affirms sure values and enjoys doing so. Jacobs grounds his rationalization of moral price in specified explorations of the ethical psychology of self-love, friendship, and recognize. scholars and students of philosophy may be intrigued by means of this built-in account of meta-ethics, functional cause, and ethical psychology.
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Additional info for Practical Realism and Moral Psychology
Jonathan A. Practical realism and moral psychology / Jonathan Jacobs. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. Realism. 2. Self-acceptance. 3. Reasoning. 4. Friendship. 5. Respect. I. Title. 2-dc20 ISBN 0-87840-583-6 94-37060 Page iii Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 1: Where in the World is Ethical Value? 17 Naturalism and Supervenience 25 Practical Realism and Internal Realism 35 Wiggins' Sensible Subjectivism 42 Disclosure and Significance 45 Ethical Description 50 Metaethics Matters 55 2: From Metaethics to Moral Psychology 57 Character, Reason, and Habituation 58 Cognitivism and Character 69 3: Self-love 72 Self-Love and Human Nature 72 Pleasure and Good 76 Loving Our Own Good 86 Revising Aristotle's View 93 4: Friendship 98 What are Friends For?
Humeans and other antirealists don't see themselves as having to make do somehow with much more austere or less muscular resources than realists or Kantians. They deny that the resources that realists and Kantians claim are needed for ethics are indeed needed. So, many theorists whose positions might appropriately be labeled "skeptical" are not skeptical about the genuineness and importance of ethical considerations. Rather, they account for them differently than realists and Kantians because of the differences in their interpretations of human nature and human action.
To say it's a fact that the river flooded the fields is just to say that the river flooded the fields. To say it is a fact that what he did was slander the other fellow, and it's a fact that slander is wrong, is just to say that what he did was slander him, and his slandering him was wrong. Moral claims register the ethical significance of realities, and register it realistically. Values are not an additional category of entities, but what the value situation is is a matter of the facts. Realism, I believe, is the most successful metaethic in accounting for the locus and nature of value, for both moral properties and requirements, for the pluralism and incommensurability of values, and for the phenomenology of ethical thought.